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NOTES
CRIMINAL LAW-DEFENSE OF VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION NO
LONGER AVAILABLE TO DISPROVE INTENT. White v. State, 290 Ark.
130, 717 S.W.2d 784 (1986).
Charles Lee White was charged with first degree murder for the
January 15, 1985 beating death of his wife. At his trial, in the Greene
County Circuit Court, White invoked the defense of voluntary intoxica-
tion. The trial judge decided that, since the lesser included offense of
second degree murder did not require a "specific intent" on the part of
the defendant, it was not subject to the defense of voluntary intoxica-
tion. The jury was instructed accordingly and White was thereafter
convicted of second degree murder. The trial judge's decision was in
accord with previous holdings of the Arkansas Court of Appeals.' The
court of appeals had previously held that crimes, including second de-
gree murder, that required "knowingly," as opposed to "purposefully"
as the requisite mental state, do not require a showing of specific in-
tent, and are not amenable to the defense of voluntary intoxication.'
White appealed the trial court's decision to the Arkansas Supreme
Court. On appeal, he maintained that the trial court erred in in-
structing the jury that voluntary intoxication was not a defense to sec-
ond degree murder. The Arkansas Supreme Court did not reach this
question, finding instead that the defense no longer exists in Arkansas,
regardless of the mental state required for a particular crime. White v.
State, 290 Ark. 130, 717 S.W.2d 784 (1986).
Historically, the defense s of voluntary intoxication has been ac-
corded a hostile reception. In the fourth century B.C., Aristotle wrote
that "penalties are doubled in the case of drunkenness, for the moving
principle is in the man himself, since he had the power of not getting
1. Bowen v. State, 268 Ark. 1088, 598 S.W.2d 447 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980).
2. Id.
3. The term "defense" will be used throughout as a convenient method of describing an as-
sertion by a defendant that his voluntary intoxication precluded his forming the requisite degree of
intent necessary for conviction under a particular criminal statute. The word "defense" is actually
a misnomer due to the fact that such an assertion is not really a defense, but is an assertion that
the requisite elements of the crime charged do not exist.
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drunk and his getting drunk was the cause of his ignorance."4 The ethi-
cal opinions of Aristotle in this regard were referred to in the first re-
corded case on the issue of voluntary intoxication as a criminal defense.
In 1551, the court in Reniger v. Fogossa" stated:
If a person that is drunk kills another, this shall be felony, and he
shall be imprisoned for it, and yet he did it through ignorance, for
when he was drunk he had not understanding nor memory; but inas-
much as that ignorance was occasioned by his own act and folly, and
he might have avoided it, he shall not be privileged thereby.'
During the early history of the law, not only was voluntary intoxi-
cation not a defense to a crime, but courts were prone to hold that it
was an "aggravation" of the offense since "it is a great offence in it-
self." Exception was soon taken to the common law's rigid stand on
the issue in situations in which permanent insanity had resulted from a
defendant's habitual intoxication or in which the intoxication was invol-
untary.8 The defense was initially allowed only in these limited situa-
tions. It was not until the nineteenth century, however, that any ame-
lioration of the inflexible common law rule regarding self-induced
intoxication was attempted.'
Apparently, the earliest case allowing for any modification of the
old common law rule was Rex v. Grindley,'0 in 1819. The court in
Grindley decided that, although voluntary intoxication is not a defense
to a crime, it is relevant in determining whether an act was premedi-
tated." Similarly, in the 1849 case of Reg v. Monkhouse,1 2 the judge
instructed the jury that voluntary intoxication was available as a par-
tial answer to a charge of wounding with intent to murder when "the
4. ARISTOTLE, ETHICA NICOMACHEA, bk. 3, ch. 5, in 9 THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE TRANS-
LATED INTO ENGLISH II 13b (W.D. Ross trans. 1st ed. 1915).
5. I Plowden 1, 75 Eng. Rep. I (K.B. 1551).
6. Id. at 19, 75 Eng. Rep. at 31 (footnotes omitted).
7. Beverley's Case of Non Compos Mentis, 4 Co. Rep. 123b, 76 Eng. Rep. 118 (K.B. 1603).
"Aggravation" may not have meant that the law would deal more harshly with the intoxicated
offender. The term "aggravation" is likely to have meant only that the law would not excuse a
voluntarily intoxicated offender, due to the absence of the requisite mental state, as it would an
infant or an idiot. See Beck and Parker, The Intoxicated Offender-A Problem of Responsibility,
44 CANADIAN B. REV. 563, 574 n.56 (1966).
8. 1 HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 31-32 (1847). Sir Matthew Hale
was the Lord Chief Justice of the Court of King's Bench in the 17th century.
9. 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 442 n.4 (2d ed. 1937).
10. Id. See Annotation, Voluntary Intoxication as a Defense to Homicide, 12 A.L.R. 861,
867 (1921); 1 W. RUSSELL. A TREATISE ON CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 12 n.(t) (C. Greaves 4th
ed. 1865) (1979).
11. I RUSSEL, supra note 10, at 12.
12. Id. at 13.
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intoxication was such as to prevent [the defendant from] restraining
himself from committing the act in question, or to take away from him
the power of forming any specific intention."8
In the United States, the early common law decisions enunciated
the rule that voluntary intoxication, though not a defense, is relevant to
the issue of whether a defendant was capable of forming the degree of
intent required for a particular crime.' This common law rule is still
followed in the majority of jurisdictions today. Presently, twenty-seven
states give statutory recognition to a showing of voluntary intoxication
for the purpose of negativing intent.15 These states are generally in ac-
cord with section 2.08 of the Model Penal Code. 6 Two states, Hawaii
and Iowa, allow a defendant to present evidence of self-induced intoxi-
cation for the purpose of negativing any element of a crime.' 7 Con-
versely, the Texas and Pennsylvania statutes specifically preclude evi-
dence of voluntary intoxication for the purpose of negativing intent. 8
13. Id. (quoting Reg. v. Monkhouse, 4 Cox C.C. 55).
14. See Garner v. State, 28 Fla. 113, 9 So. 835 (1891); Crosby v. People, 137 Ill. 325, 27
N.E. 49 (1891). At least two states, California and New York, gave statutory recognition to the
common law rule by the late 19th century. See People v. Hill, 123 Cal. 47, 49, 55 P. 692, 693
(1898); People v. Corey, 148 N.Y. 476, 490-91, 42 N.E. 1066, 1071 (1896).
15. ALA. CODE § 13A-3-2 (1982); ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.630 (1983); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-503 (Supp. 1986); CAL. PENAL CODE § 22 (West Supp. 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-803
(1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-7 (West 1985); IDAHO CODE § 18.116 (1979); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 38, para. 6-3 (Smith-Hurd 1972); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-5 (Burns 1985); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-3208 (1981); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 501-080 (Baldwin 1984); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14.15 (West 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 37 (1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
609.075 (West 1964); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 562.076 (Vernon Supp. 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-
2-203 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 193.220 (1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626.4 (1986); N.J.
STAT ANN. § 2c:2-8 (West Supp. 1986); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.25 (McKinney 1975); N.D. CENT.
CODE ANN. § 12.1-04-02 (1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.125 (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §
22-5-5 (Rev. 1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-306 (1978); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.16.090
(1977); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 939.42 (West 1982); WYO. STAT. § 6-1-202 (1977). These states vary
upon the extent to which voluntary intoxication may be used to negate the mental state of a
defendant. For example, the Alabama statute states that voluntary intoxication may not be used
to negate a "knowing" mental state. Colorado, among others, has refused to extend the defense to
a "knowing" mental state through its case law decisions, though the state statute is not specific in
this regard. See Hendershott v. People, 653 P.2d 385, 396 (Colo. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1225 (1983). Some of the statutes specifically state that voluntary intoxication may only be used
to negate a specific intent, while others are more general, referring only to negation of intent, or
mental state.
16. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(1) (1985), states that "intoxication of the actor is not a
defense unless it negatives an element of the offense." All of the above statutes were not necessa-
rily modeled after this Model Penal Code provision. They are all in agreement with the Code,
however, in that voluntary intoxication is not a defense except to the extent that it serves to
negative an element of the offense.
17. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 702-230 (1976); IOWA CODE ANN. § 701.5 (West 1979).
18. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.04 (Vernon 1974) (such evidence may be introduced in order
to show that temporary insanity resulted from the intoxication. Such a showing will only bear on
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The statutes in Georgia and Oklahoma simply provide that voluntary
intoxication is not a defense to a criminal charge. 9 Under the case law
of these states, however, evidence of such intoxication is permitted for
the purpose of negativing intent. 20 The Delaware statute21 is textually
similar to those of Georgia and Oklahoma. Two months after the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court decided White v. State,22 however, Delaware
also adopted the position that voluntary intoxication may not be used in
any respect to exculpate a defendant from a criminal charge. 23
The remaining fifteen states have either repealed or have not en-
acted statutes specifically providing that voluntary intoxication may or
may not be shown by a defendant in order to mitigate criminal liabil-
ity.21 The majority of these fifteen states allow the defendant to show
evidence of voluntary intoxication to negative intent. They adhere to
the prevailing formulation of the common law rule in which a distinc-
tion is drawn between those crimes requiring specific intent and those
requiring only a general intent. In these states, voluntary intoxication
may be asserted to negative the existence of a specific intent, but is
inapplicable to crimes of general intent.26 This distinction between spe-
mitigation of the punishment). PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 308 (Purdon 1983) (exception allowed for
first degree murder).
19. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-4 (1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 153 (West 1983).
20. See Williams v. State, 180 Ga. App. 854, 350 S.E.2d 837 (1986); Grayson v. State, 687
P.2d 747 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984).
21. DEL CODE ANN. tit 11, § 421 (1979).
22. 290 Ark. 130, 717 S.W.2d 784 (1986).
23. Wyant v. State, 519 A.2d 649 (Del. 1986).
24. These fifteen states are Florida, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Ne-
braska, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont,
Virginia and West Virginia.
25. A general intent exists when the defendant possesses the ability to foresee that a certain
result might occur from his engaging in a particular course of conduct. Specific intent, on the
other hand, requires not only that the result have been merely foreseeable, but such a result must
have actually been intended by the defendant when he engaged in the particular course of con-
duct. M. BASSIOUNI. SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 178-79 (1978).
26. See, e.g., Burnham v. State, 497 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 1986); Avey v. State, 249 Md. 385,
240 A.2d 107 (1968); People v. Watts, 133 Mich. App. 80, 348 N.W.2d 39 (1984); State v.
Privett, 104 N.M. 79, 717 P.2d 55 (1986); State v. Hurst, 82 N.C. App. 1, 346 S.E.2d 8 (1986);
State v. Fox, 68 Ohio St. 2d 53, 428 N.E.2d 410 (1981); State v. McGehearty, 121 R.I. 55, 394
A.2d 1348 (1978); State v. D'Amico, 136 Vt. 153, 385 A.2d 1082 (1978). West Virginia allows
voluntary intoxication to be shown to reduce the degree .of a crime or negative specific intent. See
State v. Keeton, 272 S.E.2d 817 (W. Va. 1980). Virginia allows negation of specific intent for first
degree murder, but for no other crimes. See Essex v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 273, 322 S.E.2d
216 (1984). Nebraska permits evidence of voluntary intoxication to show that the defendant was
"wholly deprived of reason so as to prevent the requisite criminal intent." See State v. Prim, 201
Neb. 279, 267 N.W.2d 193, 197 (1978). Massachusetts, Mississippi, and South Carolina do not
allow the defense to negate specific intent. Commonwealth v. Stewart, 359 Mass. 671, 679, 270
N.E.2d 811, 816 (1971), vacated as to death penalty, 408 U.S. 845 (1972) (per curiam); McDan-
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cific and general intent is also followed in most states that have codified
the common law rule on the subject. 8
For approximately one hundred years, Arkansas held in accord
with the majority of state common law decisions on the issue of volun-
tary intoxication.2 9 The decision of the Arkansas Supreme Court in the
1879 case of Wood v. State80 parallels the modern holdings in this re-
gard.3' In Wood the court held that as a general doctrine, voluntary
intoxication furnished no excuse for a crime, but for crimes requiring
specific intent, it may be asserted in order to show absence of such
intent.32 According to this view, which is followed under the case law
or statutes of the majority of American jurisdictions today, such an
assertion is not actually a defense to a crime once committed, but is an
allegation that, due to the non-existence of the requisite mental state,
the particular crime charged has not occurred. 3 In light of this fact, it
is understandable that most state statutes that allow voluntary intoxica-
tion to be shown for the purpose of negativing intent also state that
such intoxication is not a defense to criminal conduct.3 4
Prior to the adoption of the 1976 Criminal Code, the Arkansas
statutes contained a variety of amorphous terms to define the mental
state required for a particular act to be considered criminal.38 Various
terms employed in defining the particular requisite mental state in-
cluded "evil design," "implied malice," "cruel," "wanton," and "delib-
erate."3 6 From these abstract terms, it was the duty of the courts to
determine whether a particular crime required a specific intent or sim-
ply a general intent. The courts' task of determining into which cate-
iel v. State, 356 So. 2d 1151 (Miss. 1978) (allowed the defense to show that defendant did not
"know right from wrong"); State v. Vaughn, 268 S.C. 119, 232 S.E.2d 328 (1977) (allowed the
defense if permanent insanity produced).
27. The "common law rule" referred to herein is the general view that voluntary intoxication
is not a defense to a crime, but may be asserted in order to negative the element of intent.
28. See, e.g., Coon v. State, 494 So. 2d 184 (Ala. Ct. App. 1986); CAL PENAL CODE § 22
(West Supp. 1987).
29. See Myrick v. State, 244 Ark. 1157, 428 S.W.2d 241 (1968); High v. State, 197 Ark.
681, 120 S.W.2d 24 (1938); Bennett v. State, 161 Ark. 496, 257 S.W. 372 (1923); Alford v.
State, 110 Ark. 300, 161 S.W. 497 (1913); Chowning v. State, 91 Ark. 503, 121 S.W. 735
(1909); See also Comment, Intoxication as a Defense to Criminal Actions in Arkansas, 11 ARK.
L. REV. 160 (1956-57).
30. 34 Ark. 341 (1879).
31. See R. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAw 39 n.28 (2d Ed. 1986).
32. 34 Ark. 341 (1879).
33. See 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 68 (1961 & 1986 Cum. Supp.) and cases cited therein.
34. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.630 (1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-7 (West
1972).
35. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-203 commentary (1977).
36. Id.
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gory a particular crime fell was simplified with the adoption of the
1976 Criminal Code. 7 The new Code enunciated and defined four
mental states to be associated with particular crimes.3 8 Arkansas Stat-
utes Annotated section 41-203 lists these mental states as "purposely,"
"knowingly," "recklessly," and "negligently."" 9
Also included in the 1976 Criminal Code was Arkansas Statutes
Annotated section 41-207(a), which provided that "[s]elf-induced in-
toxication is an affirmative defense to a prosecution if it negates the
existence of a purposeful or knowing mental state."' 0 This provision,
coupled with the simultaneous enactment of the provision regarding
culpable mental states, would seem to have added clarity to this area of
the law in Arkansas. The apparent clarity was short-lived. In 1977 the
provision relating to self-induced intoxication was repealed.41 Act 101
of 1977, which repealed section 41-207(a), was entitled "An Act to
Eliminate Self-Induced Intoxication as a Defense to Criminal Prosecu-
tion,"" and was designated as an emergency act that was to take effect
37. Act of Mar. 3, 1975, No. 280, 1975 Ark. Acts 500.
38. Act of Mar. 3, 1975, No. 280, § 203, 1975 Ark. Acts 519 (codified at ARK. STAT. ANN. §
41-201 (1977)).
39. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-203 (1977) defines these mental states as follows:
(1) "Purposely." A person acts purposely with respect to his conduct or a result
thereof when it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to
cause such a result.
(2) "Knowingly." A person acts knowingly with respect to his conduct or the attend-
ant circumstances when he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such
circumstances exist. A person acts knowingly with respect to a result of his con-
duct when he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause
such a result.
(3) "Recklessly." A person acts recklessly with respect to attendant circumstances or
a result of his conduct when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifi-
able risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of
a nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the
standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation.
(4) "Negligently." A person acts negligently with respect to attendant circumstances
or result of his conduct when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such
a nature and degree that the actor's failure to perceive it, considering the nature
and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves a gross
deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the
actor's situation.
40. Act of Mar. 3, 1975, No. 280, § 207, 1975 Ark. Acts. 523 (codified as amended at ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 41-207 (1977)).
41. Act of Feb. 4, 1977, No. 101, 1977 Ark. Acts 125 (codified at ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-207
(1977)).
42. 1977 Ark. Acts 125. The full title of this act is "An Act to Amend Section 207 of Act
280 of 1975 to Eliminate Self-Induced Intoxication as a Defense to Criminal Prosecution; and for
Other Purposes."
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immediately upon its passage.4 The repeal of section 41-207(a)
presented what seemed to be a paradox. On the one hand, prosecution
of offenses required proof of conduct coupled with a culpable mental
state. On the other hand, after the enactment of Act 101 of 1977, a
defendant was prohibited from showing an absence of the requisite
mental state, if he were planning to contend that his intoxication pre-
vented him from forming an intent to commit the crime with which he
was charged.
The Arkansas Supreme Court avoided the paradox, for the time
being, in Varnedare v. State." In Varnedare the court held that the
1977 legislative repeal of section 41-207(a) eliminated only the statuto-
rily based defense, leaving intact the prior common law holdings on the
subject.4 ' The court noted that the case law on the subject remained as
stated in Clles v. State," in which the court held that the defense of
self-induced intoxication was available if it rendered the defendant in-
capable of forming the intent that was a necessary element of the
crime. 447
Since the defendant in Varnedare raised the voluntary intoxication
defense to negative the existence of a "purposeful" mental state, the
question was still open whether such a defense was also available when
the particular criminal charge required only "knowingly" as the culpa-
ble mental state. The Arkansas Court of Appeals addressed this ques-
tion in Bowen v. State." The court in Bowen followed the reasoning of
the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Booten," in which the court
stated that "knowingly" refers to general criminal knowledge and in-
tent that can be inferred from the facts and circumstances surrounding
43. Id. Section 3 of Act 101 of 1977 stated:
It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the defense of volun-
tary intoxication is detrimental to the welfare and safety of the citizens of this State in
that criminals are at times excused from the consequences of their criminal acts merely
because of their voluntary intoxication and that this Act is necessary to eliminate the
defense of self-induced or voluntary intoxication. Therefore, an emergency is hereby
declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the
public peace, health and safety, shall be in effect from the date of its passage and
approval.
1977 Ark. Acts 125, 126.
44. 264 Ark. 596, 573 S.W.2d 57 (1978).
45. Id.
46. 260 Ark. 571, 542 S.W.2d 755 (1976).
47. Id. at 577, 542 S.W.2d at 759. The court in OCles cited Robertson v. State, 212 Ark. 301,
206 S.W.2d 748 (1947) and Wood v. State, 34 Ark. 341 (1879) as authority for the holding.
48. 268 Ark. 1088, 598 S.W.2d 447 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980).
49. 85 Ida. 51, 375 P.2d 536 (1962).
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the crime itself.50 In Bowen, the court of appeals held that the defense
of voluntary intoxication was not available to disprove the "knowingly"
mental state.' 1
Subsequent to the decision in Bowen, Professor Ellen Liebman"
argued that the voluntary intoxication defense should be available to
disprove a "knowing" mental state.'3 This contention was grounded on
the assertion that although "knowingly" does not fit neatly into either
side of the general intent/specific intent dichotomy, the determination
of whether something was done "knowingly" is an issue to which the
question of intoxication is relevant." It was argued that voluntary in-
toxication should be allowed as a defense to a crime with "knowingly"
as the requisite intent because "[i]f the mental state which is the basis
of the law's concern does not exist, the reason for its non-existence is
quite plainly immaterial.""
In 1985, in Mosier v. State,"" the Arkansas Supreme Court, citing
Professor Liebman, acknowledged that there was present confusion sur-
rounding the defense of voluntary intoxication.' The court in Mosier
expressed a willingness to re-examine the law in the area at a time
when adversary briefs on the subject were presented before it." In Oc-
tober 1986, White v. State," provided this opportunity.
In White v. State, the Arkansas Supreme Court's brief treatment
of the intoxication issue was straightforward and based solely on an
analysis of legislative intent. After summarizing the history of the vol-
untary intoxication defense in Arkansas, the court turned to an exami-
nation of the legislature's purpose in repealing section 41-207(a) of the
1976 Criminal Code relating to voluntary intoxication. The court began
by noting that "[i]t is a principle of statutory construction that a stat-
ute will not be construed as overruling a principle of common law 'un-
less it is made plain by the act that such a change in the established
50. 268 Ark. at 1092, 598 S.W.2d at 449 (quoting State v. Booten, 85 Ida. at 56, 375 P.2d at
538-39).
51. 268 Ark. 1088, 598 S.W.2d 447 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980).
52. Ellen Liebman is a former assistant professor at the University of Arkansas, Fayetteville,
School of Law.
53. Liebman, Voluntary Intoxication as a Defense to Crime, 1983 ARK. L. NOTES 29.
54. Id. at 31.
55. Id. at 31 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 comment 3, at 9 (Tent. Draft No. 9,
1959)).
56. 285 Ark. 67, 684 S.W.2d 810 (1985).
57. Id. at 68-69, 684 S.W.2d at 811.
58. Id.
59. 290 Ark. 130, 717 S.W.2d 784 (1986).
[Vol. 9:657
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law is intended.' "10 In ascertaining the intention behind the repealing
act,6" the court placed emphasis upon the fact that the repealing act
was designated an emergency act that was intended to take effect im-
mediately upon its passage." In light of this fact, the court declared
that Varnedare v. State" was an erroneous decision, and held that the
legislative intent underlying the passage of the emergency act was to
eliminate entirely the defense of self-induced intoxication in criminal
prosecutions.6' In conclusion, the court stated that "[b]y reinstating the
common law rule, which permitted voluntary intoxication as a defense
to crimes requiring a specific intent, this court has perpetuated a rule
of law which the legislature effectively repealed."66
The decision in White v. State seems to preclude the introduction
of all evidence of a defendant's voluntary intoxication. Prior to White
such evidence was only relevant when introduced for the purpose of
negativing intent. This sole purpose was invalidated through the deci-
sion. The court in White did not venture beyond an analysis of the
legislative intent surrounding the passage of the 1977 amendment to
the Arkansas voluntary intoxication statute in order to consider
whether an absolute refusal to allow proof which tends to negative an
element of a crime might be constitutionally suspect. Since the prose-
cution is required to prove each element of an offense beyond a reason-
able doubt,66 it is questionable whether a state may absolutely bar the
introduction of negativing evidence which tends to cast doubt upon the
existence of a particular element.
Courts dealing with the issue of voluntary intoxication have gener-
ally operated under the assumption that voluntary intoxication is an
affirmative, gratuitous defense that may be allowed, disallowed, or pro-
60. Id. at 136, 717 S.W.2d at 787 (quoting Starkey Constr. Inc. v. Elcon Inc., 248 Ark. 958,
457 S.W.2d 509 (1970)).
61. 1977 Ark. Acts 125.
62. Id.
63. 264 Ark. 596, 573 S.W.2d 57 (1978).
64. White, 290 Ark. at 135-37, 717 S.W.2d at 787.
65. Id. at 136-37, 717 S.W.2d at 787.
66. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977). The Court in Patterson stated that
the "Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the
elements included in the definition of the offense of which the defendant is charged." Id. In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970), held that "the Due Process Clause protects the accused
against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to consti-
tute the crime with which he is charged." Id. The difference between the Court's use of the word
"elements" in Patterson, as opposed to its use of the wordfact in Winship is probably insignificant
in light of the fact that the Court, in using the above language in Patterson stated that the rule
derives from "previous cases." 432 U.S. at 210. Winship would undoubtedly be the primary previ-
ous case to which the Court was referring.
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cedurally manipulated in any manner that the state deems appropri-
ate.7 Reliance upon this assumption is misplaced. As the defense of
voluntary intoxication serves exclusively as a negativing defense, the
decisions of the United States Supreme Court preclude it from being
constitutionally classified so as to allow the prosecution to escape its
duty to prove each element included within the definition of an offense
beyond a reasonable doubt.68 When a negativing defense is classified as
affirmative, and the state seeks to place the burden of proof of the de-
fense upon the defendant, the prosecution escapes this duty. 9 This was
recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Patterson v. New
York,7 0 as well as in the recent decision of Martin v. Ohio.7 1
67. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Goddard v. Vaughn, 614 F.2d 929, 935 (3d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 844 (1980); Wyant v. State, 519 A.2d 649 (Del. 1986); Wyant, decided
approximately two months after White, held that a defendant charged with robbery, kidnapping
and rape, could not introduce evidence of voluntary intoxication to prove that it was not his "con-
scious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause that result." 519 A.2d at 659. The
prosecution was required to prove such a "conscious object" as an element of the crimes with
which the defendant in Wyant was charged. Id. The court stated that the defendant's due process
argument that he should not be precluded from presenting evidence of voluntary intoxication for
the purpose of negativing intent was premised upon the "erroneous assumption that voluntary
intoxication is a constitutionally protected defense to criminal conduct." Id. at 660. Goddard was
cited as authority for this statement. Id. The court in Goddard, in holding that the defendant
could be forced to bear the burden of proof upon the issue of voluntary intoxication, stated that
voluntary intoxication is an affirmative, "gratuitous" defense that is not constitutionally required.
614 F.2d at 935.
68. See Martin v. Ohio, 107 S.Ct. 1098 (1987); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197
(1977); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
69. To understand why this is so, consider a situation in which there is an element (A), with
only three defenses (X, Y, and Z) that served to negative that element. For the prosecution to
prove A. it is necessary that it prove "not X," "not Y," and "not 7" inclusive, for the burden of
proving the element beyond a reasonable doubt to be met. If either X, Y, or Z are required to be
proved by the defendant, the prosecution is relieved of this burden. See infra note 70.
70. 432 U.S. 197 (1977). Patterson dealt with the question of whether a state could constitu-
tionally classify "extreme emotional disturbance" as an affirmative defense to the crime of mur-
der. In upholding such a classification the Court noted:
This affirmative defense, which the Court of Appeals described as permitting "the de-
fendant to show that his actions were caused by a mental infirmity not arising to the
level of insanity, and that he is less culpable for having committed them" ... does not
serve to negative any facts of the crime which the State is required to prove in order to
convict of murder. It constitutes a separate issue upon which the defendant is required
to carry the burden of persuasion.
432 U.S. at 206-07 (citation omitted) (quoting People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d 288, 302, 347
N.E.2d 898, 907 (1976)).
71. 107 S.Ct. 1098 (1987). Martin dispelled the notion that an affirmative defense could not
be classified as such merely because certain proof offered in support of the defense might also
serve to negative an element of the crime. In holding that Ohio could constitutionally classify self-
defense as an affirmative defense to aggravated murder the Court stated:
It would be quite different if the jury had been instructed that self-defense evidence
could not be considered in determining whether there was a reasonable doubt about the
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The refusal of a state to allow evidence of voluntary intoxication
for the purpose of negativing intent effectively relieves the prosecution
of its duty to prove the element beyond a reasonable doubt.7 If a state
chooses to include a particular element within the definition of an of-
fense, the state is not free to carve out "segments" of that element to
which the In re Winshipf S standard for burden of proof is inapplicable.
Furthermore, the logic that would allow a state to refuse to consider
evidence of voluntary intoxication for the purpose of negativing intent
would just as easily allow the state to refuse to hear evidence tending to
show that an act occurred by accident and thus was not intentional. If
a state is allowed to completely eliminate negativing defenses, the state
could ultimately refuse to allow any defense that could conceivably
serve to negative a particular element, thus preventing the defendant
from attempting to counter any proof offered by the prosecution in re-
gard to that element. A state should not be allowed to thwart the Win-
state's case, i.e., that self-defense evidence must be put aside for all purposes unless it
satisfied the preponderance of the evidence standard. Such instruction would relieve the
state of its burden and plainly run afoul of Winship's mandate.
Id. at 1102 (citing Winship, 397 U.S. at 364).
Martin seems to mean that, to the precise extent that a defense serves to negative an element,
such a defense may not be treated as affirmative. Given this meaning, the holding of Martin would
appear to be that to the extent that self-defense serves to negative an element of the crime of
murder, the defendant need only present evidence sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to the
existence of the element. The burden of proof as to the "negativing portion" of the affirmative
defense of self-defense may not be placed upon the defendant. Only the "portion" of evidence
presented in support of the defense that does not serve to negative any element of the crime of
murder may be constitutionally treated as an affirmative defense. Unlike the affirmative defense of
self-defense under consideration in Martin, evidence proffered in support of the defense of volun-
tary intoxication is not divisible into portions consisting of non-negativing evidence and negativing
evidence. The defense is only recognized for the exclusive purpose of negativing the element of
intent. All evidence properly admitted in support of the defense is by definition negativing
evidence.
72. To understand why this is so, consider again the hypothetical situation referred to in note
68, supra. As noted, for the prosecution to prove element A in the hypothetical, it is necessary for
it to prove "not X", "not Y," and "not Z." If the prosecution is required to prove "not X", for
example, but the defendant is precluded from introducing evidence of X, the prosecution is in
effect "given" that portion of the element.
The truth of the proposition that refusal to allow negativing evidence relieves the prosecution
of its burden of proof is illustrated by the statement of the Delaware Supreme Court in Wyant v.
State, 519 A.2d at 660, that "[tihe elimination of voluntary intoxication as a defense did not
relieve the state of its burden of proving that defendant otherwise possessed the requisite intent."
(Emphasis added), in Patterson v. New York, the United States Supreme Court held that the
prosecution is required to prove each element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 432 U.S.
at 210. Patterson did not hold that the prosecution must prove each element beyond a reasonable
doubt except as otherwise provided by the state.
73. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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ship7 4 standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt by refusing to allow
evidence tending to cast such a doubt upon that which the prosecution
is required to prove.
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